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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4555
This paper studies the relationship between gender and 
corruption in the health sector. It uses data collected 
directly from health workers, during a recent public 
expenditure tracking survey in Tajikistan’s health sector. 
Using informal payments as an indicator of corruption, 
women seem at first significantly less corrupt than men 
as consistently suggested by the literature. However, 
once power conferred by position is controlled for, 
women appear in fact equally likely to take advantage of 
corruption opportunities as men. Female-headed facilities 
also are not less likely to experience informal charging 
than facilities managed by men. However, women are 
This paper—a product of ECA PREM and the Human Development and Public Services Team, Development Research 
Group—is part of a larger effort in the department to understand corruption in public services especially coping strategies 
health workers adopt such as informal payments and the holding of other jobs outside the facility. Policy Research Working 
Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. Andrew Dabalen may be contacted at adabalen@worldbank.
org and Waly Wane at wwane@worldbank.org. 
significantly less aggressive in the amount they extract 
from patients. The paper provides evidence that workers 
are more likely to engage in informal charging the 
farther they fall short of their perceived fair-wage, adding 
weight to the fair wage-corruption hypothesis. Finally, 
there is some evidence that health workers who feel that 
health care should be provided for a fee are more likely 
to informally charge patients. Contrary to informal 
charging, moonlighting behavior displays strong gender 
differences. Women are significantly less likely to work 
outside the facility on average and across types of health 
workers.Informal Payments and Moonlighting in Tajikistan’s Health Sector 
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  11. Introduction 
 
The causes and consequences of corruption are well researched and widely known. There is 
ample cross-country empirical evidence that corruption slows growth, reduces public and 
private investment (Mauro 1995), and negatively impacts service delivery (World Bank 
2004). However, knowledge about what causes individuals to engage in corrupt or illegal 
activities is scant. Several determinants of individual corruption have been recently proposed 
among which the most stunning and not least controversial is gender. Proponents of this 
theory claim that men’s proclivity towards corruption is inherently higher than women’s. 
This paper investigates this issue and presents new evidence based on data collected during a 
public expenditure tracking survey (PETS) in Tajikistan’s health sector. It shows that women 
are no less prone to extorting illegal payments from patients than men once the proper 
variables, such as power conferred by position for instance, are controlled for. 
 
Men and women certainly display countless obvious physical and physiological differences. 
Attitudinal gender differences have been an active research matter for sociologists and 
psychologists for many decades. Although moderate to large differences are acknowledged in 
some areas (e.g. sexuality and aggression) men and women display more similarities than 
differences (see Hyde, 2005). Economists started to integrate gender in their analysis only 
recently and have uncovered interesting gender differences mostly through experiments. This 
paper studies two important forms of corruption in the health sector (1) informal charging 
and (2) moonlighting. Informal charging is a bribe-taking practice and is clearly classified as 
an illegal activity. Moonlighting is a more subtle form of corruption because it is not readily 
identified as theft or use of public office for private gain. In fact, moonlighting is a strong 
determinant of absenteeism and workers who collect their salary but do not show up at work 
can be considered as stealing public money (see Lewis 2006).  
 
The main result of this paper is that with similar power and opportunities, women are equally 
likely as men to extract bribes by informally charging patients. However, among doctors and 
doctors only, women are less aggressive than men, i.e., they charge smaller amounts. Women 
are, on the other hand, significantly less likely to moonlight than men and this holds true 
even within positions. Finally the paper shows that there is some evidence for the fair wage-
  2corruption hypothesis but no support for the fair wage-shirking hypothesis. Specifically, 
workers whose perceived fair wage is much lower than their actual wage are more likely to 
engage in informal charging but they are not more likely to moonlight. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature relevant to this paper. 
Section 3 describes the Tajikistan PETS data used in the paper and presents summary 
statistics. Section 4 states the econometric strategy used to identify the impact of gender on 
informal charges and moonlighting. Section 5 presents the results and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related  Literature 
 
This section reviews two strands of literature to which this paper is linked. We first address 
the specific literature of corruption in the health sector before turning to the gender and 
corruption literature. 
 
2.1  Corruption in Health 
 
The health sector often ranks among the most corrupt in many developing countries. In a 
survey on corruption perceptions in 23 countries the health sector ranked in the top four in 
ten countries. The many forms of corruption in the health sector range from the 
commercialization of public positions to staff absenteeism (see Lewis 2006). Corruption also 
arises at several levels, from the central government to the health facilities including all 
intermediary administrative layers. This sub-section focuses on corruption at the front-line 
service delivery level.  
 
The most pervasive and studied form of corruption at the point of service delivery is informal 
payments. Informal payments can be broadly defined as direct unofficial payments, in-kind 
or in cash, from patients to health workers for the latter’s personal benefit. The study of 
informal payments poses major challenges, the first of which is measurement. Users are the 
most common source of information on informal payments through household surveys and 
patients’ exit polls. Unfortunately, users sometimes have a hard time distinguishing between 
  3formal fees, legal gifts and illegal payments which render the measurement of informal 
payments extremely difficult. Several authors tried to go around this problem by considering 
as informal, payments which are made for officially free services (see Chakraborty et al. 
2002, Chawla et al. 1998). Some of these payments may sometimes be misclassified as 
informal especially in countries where gift-giving is an entrenched cultural practice and 
patients voluntarily present the health workers with a gift.
2 This paper eschews this difficulty 
by collecting the information on informal payments directly from the health workers who are 
perfectly able to screen the legal and voluntary from the informal and requested or forced.  
 
The pervasiveness of informal payments in developing and transition economies has attracted 
a lot of attention because of their potentially detrimental effects on the health sector. Recent 
studies have shown that informal payments reduce access to health for the poor, worsen 
health outcomes and reinforce inequities (Killingsworth et al. 1999, Ensor 2004, Falkingham 
2004, Gotsadze et al. 2005). Others argue that informal payments act as a barrier to reform 
(Killingsworth et al. 1999, Lewis 2000, Thompson and Witter 2000), especially when they 
are entrenched and constitute an important source of income for powerful people in the sector 
such as doctors (Chawla et al. 1998). Yet, surprisingly others find that informal payments 
increase performance measured by the time health staff work in the facility (McPake et al. 
1999). This is not necessarily a sign of performance and could well be the opportunity cost of 
staying out of the facility in terms of foregone income from informal payments. Given the 
importance of informal payments, it is crucial to understand their determinants. The literature 
has been heavily focused on the users’ side to answer who pays informal payments. This 
paper comes as a complement by looking at the issue from the perspective of the providers 
themselves controlling for a wide array of health workers’ characteristics and the 
environment in which they operate. The main question this paper intends to address is “do 
women take or accept informal payments less often than men?” 
 
A second form of corruption which is of interest in this paper is moonlighting. Akerlof and 
Yellen (1990) show theoretically that workers reduce their effort when they perceive to be 
                                                 
2 Recent household surveys make an extra effort to try and distinguish between formal fees, gifts and informal 
payments. They also try to draw the difference between voluntary and requested payments (e.g. Albania LSMS 
2005). 
  4paid less than their fair wage. The reduction in effort is proportional to the distance between 
the fair and the actual wage. The fair-wage hypothesis may explain both corruption types 
considered here: informal payments and moonlighting. As Akerlof and Yellen (1998) state it 
“when people do not get what they [think they] deserve, they try to get even.” Akerlof and 
Yellen (1990) assume the only instrument at the disposal of the worker to get even is 
adjusting the level of her effort. In the health sector and maybe others, however, the worker 
has many instruments to get even. She can withdraw effort and work outside of the 
workplace, but she can also levy payments on the facility’s clients. Van Rijckeghem and 
Weder (2001) show in a cross-country regression framework that relative civil-service pay is 
strongly correlated with corruption levels and thereby corroborate the fair-wage and 
corruption relationship. Van der Gaag et al. (1989) show using household data from Côte 
d’Ivoire and Peru that civil servants’ wage disadvantage is a strong determinant of 
moonlighting. This paper tests both the fair-wage corruption and fair-wage shirking or 
moonlighting hypotheses. During the survey, the health workers are directly asked what they 
consider to be a fair wage for the work they provide.
3 Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) 
use the manufacturing sector’s wage as a comparator for all civil-servants; however, the 
salary a worker considers as fair crucially depends on personal circumstances and 
haracteristics.  
.2  Gender and Corruption 





There is a large literature on gender differences in social preferences, risk-taking behavior 
and taste for or reaction to competition.
4 For social preferences, the available experimental 
evidence offers a mixed picture with many papers showing that women are less selfish, more 
altruistic and willing to help others (Eckel and Grossman 1998, Andreoni and Vesterlund 
2001, and Seerneels et al. 2005). Other authors however find no differences across genders 
(Bolton and Katok 1995, Eckel and Grossman 2001, Croson and Buchan 1999); others still 
 
3 We do not try to assess whether the workers compare themselves to their peers in the facility as Akerlof and 
Yellen (1990), or in similar health facilities as in Summers (1988), or in the country at large using the 
manufacturing sector as reference as in Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001). 
4 Croson and Gneezy (2004) provide a nice survey of this literature which mostly consists of experiments such 
as prisoner dilemma games, dictator games, ultimatum games, or public good provision games. 
  5find women to be less altruistic (see references in Croson and Gneezy 2004). The literature 
seems more settled in showing that men are more likely to be overconfident than women who 
are less willing to enter tournaments and less eager to compete (Barber and Odean 2001, and 
Gneezy et al. 2003, and Niederle and Vesterlund 2007). The literature also shows that 
women are more averse to risk than men; a finding which is probably driven by the 
differences in overconfidence.
5 Women also seem to hold the higher moral grounds when it 
comes to making ethical decisions in the workplace (Glover et al. 1997, and Reiss and Mitra 
998).  
 a 
orld Bank study in Georgia, and individual-level data from the World Values Surveys.  
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Engaging in corruption is certainly an ethical decision though gender differences in 
corruption have received little attention from the literature. Two recent seminal papers Dollar 
et al. (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001) show that women are less likely to be involved in 
bribery, more willing to strongly condemn corrupt behaviors, and that a greater 
representation of women in higher executive or legislative public offices reduces countries’ 
overall corruption levels. Dollar et al. (2001) find in a large cross-section of countries that 
greater representation of women in parliament significantly reduces corruption. They control 
for important country characteristics that may affect both corruption and women’s 
participation in public life such as the level of economic development, or political and civil 
freedom. Swamy et al. (2001) use several independent datasets to establish the relationship 
between gender and corruption. They uncover a strong correlation (they do not claim 
causality) between gender and corruption using macro-data as Dollar et al. (2001), but more 
importantly their result is supported by micro-evidence using both firm-level data from
W
 
Few studies so far dispute the findings of Dollar et al. (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001). A 
notable exception is Sung (2003) who argues that increased women’s participation and 
reduction in corruption have no causal relationship and both are in fact caused by a fairer 
 
5 See Croson and Gneezy (2004) for references. Although the evidence overwhelmingly supports a higher 
aversion to risk for women there are important categories of individuals, e.g. managers or professional business 
persons, for whom women display an equal or even lower aversion to risk than men. Selection issues, whereby 
more risk-loving women choose these specific jobs may, however, be at play. Most studies also show that 
gender differences decrease with substantial increases in payoffs. A limited number of studies find no gender 
differences towards risk. 
  6political system. Sung (2003) shows that if one controls for rule of law, freedom of press, and 
electoral democracy, then the gender-related variables e.g. percent of women in cabinet, 
government, and parliaments do no help explain corruption. This result is in line with 
Treisman (2000) who finds that the length of exposure to democracy helps curb corruption. 
Mukherjee and Gokcekus (2004) using corruption perceptions of nearly 4,000 public officials 
in 90 public sector organizations across six countries show that increasing the proportion of 
women in the public sector reduces corruption only up to the point where women are not the 
majority. They conclude that corruption in organizations is minimized when genders are 
qually represented. 
men exert to 
ght the negative bias instead of women’s intrinsic higher standard of honesty. 
sanctions) if caught. One should expect the presence of risk to have a strong impact on the 
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Recognizing the obvious problems with cross-country studies Duflo and Topalova (2004) 
provide further evidence that women care more about public goods, and are less corrupt 
using village- and household-level data. They take advantage of a policy with built-in 
randomization, whereby one third of Pradhans’ of Gram Panchayatt (GP)
6 positions are 
reserved for women to provide a gender difference estimate which is less prone to bias. They 
show that not only are women Pradhans significantly less likely to be corrupt
7 but also 
villagers in their GP are less likely to report they had to pay a bribe to access public services 
including medical services. However, despite these achievements, villagers are more likely to 
be dissatisfied with women Pradhans and poorly rate them. It is very likely that women 
Pradhans are aware of such a perception bias against them which may provide them with an 
incentive to work harder, refrain from and rein in corruption as much as they can. Duflo and 
Topalova (2004) result may therefore merely pick up the additional effort wo
fi
 
Because of its illegality, corruption is naturally a risky business. Workers who engage in 
corrupt activities risk being laid off or punished otherwise (including non-pecuniary 
 
6 A Pradhan is the administrative chief of a Gram Panchayatt (GP) which is a collection of 5 to 15 Indian 
villages with an average total of 10,000 villagers, see Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) for more on the GP 
system and the reservation policy. 
7 It is not clear from DT’s paper how the corruption of Pradhans is measured. 
  7willingness to engage in corruption,
8 and that impact to vary with the degree of aversion to 
risk. Therefore, the results that women are less corrupt than men may merely reflect their 
higher (on average) aversion to risk. Eckel and Grossman (2003) for instance find that risk 
matters in their experiments because systematic behavioral differences between men and 
women tend to vanish with exposure to risk. 
 
To really capture gender differences towards corruption one should either control for 
individuals’ aversion to risk, or observe them in a risk-free environment. We argue that 
Tajikistan health sector offers such an ideal setting. The accountability vacuum in 
Tajikistan’s health sector, one of the most corrupt in the country,
9 coupled with a strong 
presence of women in the sector as a whole but also in the top positions such as doctors 
generate the ideal setting for studying gender differences toward corruption. Indeed, the near-
zero probability of detection and the complete absence of even a threat of sanction create a 
breeding ground for all forms of corruption. The ground becomes even more fertile for 
corruption when one accounts for the tremendous bargaining power health workers enjoy vis-
à-vis their ill clients. It is in such a risk-free environment where men and women are given 
the same opportunities to engage in corruption ceteris paribus that the study of gender 
differences is the most promising.  
 
3.  Data and Descriptive Analysis 
 
The data used in this paper come from the PETS carried out in Tajikistan’s health sector 
during the last two months of 2006. The main objectives of the PETS were to assist the 
government in improving the public financial system for the management of health 
resources, and improve service delivery, transparency and accountability in the sector. These 
                                                 
8 Abbink et al. (2002) show in an experimental bribery game that the threat of a severe penalty significantly 
reduces the probability of bribe-giving. Moreover, if the first agents still offers a bribe it is smaller in size and is 
more likely to be rejected by the second party. Olken (2007) also shows in randomized field experiment in 
Indonesia than increasing government’s audits reduce corruption. 
9 Since 2000, Tajikistan has been consistently ranked amongst the most corrupt countries by several agencies 
such as Transparency International’s CPI or the Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi’s Control of Corruption or 
Voice and Accountability indices. Moreover, the health sector is perceived as the most corrupt sector in 
Tajikistan according to several public opinion and corruption surveys (see Lewis 2006, Government of 
Tajikistan 2006). 
  8objectives are achieved through a thorough analysis of the flow of public resources in the 
sector from the central level to the frontline providers, the final intended beneficiaries. The 
PETS therefore collected data from government agencies, local government bodies, and a 
nationally representative sample of public health providers.  
 
The sample frame used is a recent census of public providers constructed during the summer 
of 2006. There are 316 health facilities in the PETS sample (out of a grand total of 2,559) 
selected using a stratified sampling strategy. In addition to a general facility survey, in each 
facility seven health workers have been randomly selected for an in-depth interview. For 
small facilities with less than seven employees, a take-all strategy has been followed. The 
final sample of health workers interviewed is 1,278. Each selected health worker answered 
an extensive structured questionnaire covering her work, household, and perception of the 
health sector. The questionnaire included a question on the amount of gifts in-kind and other 
direct payments from patients the health worker made. It also asked about moonlighting and 
the sector in which the health worker held her second job. Finally, to test for the fair wage-
effort theory the health workers were also asked about the salary they thought would be fair 
for the job they provide in the facility. 
 
Because informal payments are a sensitive issue in Tajikistan due to their illegal nature the 
collection of information was carefully designed. First, the health workers have been firmly 
reassured of the confidential nature of the questionnaire’s entire content and that it would be 
impossible to identify them. Second, it was made clear that the firm carrying out the survey 
was from the private sector and that the data would be the property of the World Bank and 
not shared with the survey firm or the government except in aggregate form. Finally, the 
question on informal payments came after other questions on health workers’ income sources 
including salary and bonuses. Unlike most surveys, however, the question about monthly 
average intake from informal payments was asked as directly as possible. The question was 
framed in a way that left no ambiguity whatsoever as to what it referred to.
10 Fortunately, the 
                                                 
10 The exact question is the following “How much did you receive on average per month from gifts in-kind and 
other direct payments from patients?” The same question was asked in a similar survey in Chad (see Gauthier 
and Wane 2005) but failed because of a high refusal rate. It would be interesting to understand under which 
  9response rate was quite high with only 87 of the health workers or 6.8 percent refusing to 
respond. The health workers agreed to disclose their monthly informal payments intake 
probably partly because it is a widespread common knowledge phenomenon and also 
because of the sheer lack of accountability in the sector.
11 It is unlikely that the omission of 
the handful of workers who refused to respond introduce a selection bias. However, we 
prefer to check whether they differ in some systematic way from the rest of the sample using 
the large set of variables collected during the survey. We regress each observable on a 
dummy variable which equals one if the informal payment data is missing. The results are 
given in table 7 for the full sample, and the sample without the Gorno-Badakhshan 
Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) region. It is mostly the age-related variables that stand out 
significant in the regressions. The non-responders are younger, less experienced, and less 
likely to be married and have children. They are also more likely to work in GBAO. 
However, as we will see later the results are robust to the exclusion of GBAO. These minor 
differences do not question the representativeness of our sample. 
 
The paper uses two measures of corruption. First we consider the average monthly intake of 
informal payments an individual health worker reports. Informal payments are very hard to 
measure from household surveys because the general public has a hard time distinguishing 
the legitimate fees from illegal ones. An advantage of the procedure used by the survey is 
that health workers’ knowledge in that regard is perfect. They clearly know what is formal 
from what is not and therefore we can be confident that we are only capturing informal 
payments intended for the personal use of the staff that collects them. Second, we ask the 
health workers whether they supply labor outside the facility and the average number of 
hours they provide on a weekly basis. Moonlighting is clearly a strong determinant of 
absenteeism and one can legitimately think that health workers are in fact “stealing” public 
money if it displaces facility work. 
                                                                                                                                                       
circumstances people respond to such direct questions but this is out of the scope of this paper and is left for 
future research. 
11 We found out after the data collection effort that Miller et al. (2000) carried out a qualitative survey with a 
similar (in spirit) question in four countries (Ukraine, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Czech Republic). They use data 
from 1,307 interviews with various public officials such as health workers (292 in the sample), teachers, police 
officers, customs officials, passport officials, court officials, etc. They found that 89 percent of health workers 
were willing to confess accepting “money or expensive gifts” from patients. 
  10 
There are a number of caveats to be noted. Since our data on informal charging and 
moonlighting is self-reported the results in the subsequent analyses may simply reflect the 
willingness to acknowledge corrupt behavior not its true incidence.
12 This is even more so 
because Tajik health workers operate in a risk-free environment and probably take advantage 
of all opportunities to take a bribe or moonlight whereas only a fraction of them truthfully 
report that behavior. Second, it is possible that health workers who did admit to informally 
charging patients still under-report the amount they extract. Therefore, a scenario where 
women are more honest in acknowledging informal charges but less candid in reporting the 




The following tables show the variables of interest for the different types of positions health 
workers hold and across the regions. 
 
Table 1: Women Presence in Tajikistan’s Health Sector (%) 
  % FemaleHead    Doctor Nurse/Feldsher Administrator  Hospital 
Attendant   All 
                
Dushanbe  40.0    42.9 95.8  75.0  100.0    67.2 
Sogd  27.9    34.0 85.4  53.2  90.0    66.3 
Khatlon  29.4    21.3 80.5  50.0  98.8    64.3 
RRS  33.3    38.7 76.5  46.9  100.0    66.1 
GBAO  61.3    66.7 100.0  60.0  100.0    86.2 
                
Tajikistan  33.2    33.7 83.9  51.9  97.8    67.3 
Source: Authors’ calculations from Tajikistan Health PETS 2006 data 
Note: Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) and Rayon under Republican Subordination (RRS) are regions 
 
Table1 presents summary statistics about the presence of women in the health sector. The 
sector is dominated by women who constitute 67.3 percent of the overall health workforce. 
Women, however, make up only 33.2 percent of the heads of facility and 33.7 percent of the 
doctors. GBAO has both the highest proportion of female doctors (2 out of three doctors are 
women) and the highest proportion of women-headed facilities with 61.3 percent. Women 
                                                 
12 Swamy et al. (2001) face a similar issue. 
  11occupy around 84 percent of the nurse and about half of the administrative positions. The 
attendants who are at the bottom of the ladder are almost exclusively women.  
 
Table 2: Prevalence of Informal Payments (%) 
  Doctor Nurse/Feldsher  Administrator Hosp.  Att   All 
           
Dushanbe  77.1 75.0  50.0 25.0    71.6 
Sogd  56.7 52.5  40.4 16.7    48.8 
Khatlon  72.2 74.7  46.4 23.8    60.2 
RRS  71.0 64.7  37.5 19.0    53.8 
GBAO  4.8 4.3  0.0 0.0    2.8 
           
Men  67.8 63.0  40.0 75.0    60.4 
Women  55.0 59.0  37.1 17.2    46.8 
           
Tajikistan  63.5 59.6  38.5 18.5    51.2 
Source: Authors’ calculations from Tajikistan Health PETS 2006 data 
Note: Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) and Rayon under Republican Subordination (RRS) are regions 
 
Despite female domination, Tajikistan’s health care system is characterized by a high level of 
informal charges as shown by table 2. Indeed, more than half the health workers admit to 
informally charging patients. The raw averages show a clear gender gap with 60.4 percent of 
men reporting informally charging patients compared to 46.8 percent for female workers. 
Health workers in Dushanbe, the capital city, are more likely to resort to informal charges 
than elsewhere in the country followed by the Khatlon region.  
 
Table 3: Magnitude of Informal Payments [Full Official Salary] (in Somonis per month) 
  Doctor Nurse/Feldsher  Administrator Hosp.  Att    All 
            
Dushanbe  131.6 [73.9]  59.2 [58.7]  42.5 [73.3]  54.0 [58.3]    95.7 [67.5] 
Sogd  32.8 [56.7]  16.1 [39.5]  25.9 [49.1]  16.2 [28.0]    22.4 [44.8] 
Khatlon  64.0 [58.1]  28.9 [43.4]  32.4 [46.3]  8.1 [29.1]    34.1 [44.9] 
RRS  31.6 [67.0]  22.1 [41.8]  18.0 [52.9]  4.2 [27.8]    20.8 [47.8] 
GBAO  3.8 [58.7]  1.7 [43.8]  0.0 [43.4]  0.0 [33.0]    1.5 [44.4] 
            
Men  64.4 [60.9]  28.0 [43.8]  24.7 [50.2]  122.5 [53.5]    48.2 [54.8] 
Women  27.0 [61.7]  21.6 [42.4]  25.4 [46.7]  6.0 [29.2]    19.4 [42.7] 
            
Tajikistan  51.8 [61.20  22.7 [42.7]  25.1 [48.4]  8.6 [29.7]    28.8 [46.6] 
Source: Authors’ calculations from Tajikistan Health PETS 2006 data 
Note: Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) and Rayon under Republican Subordination (RRS) are regions 
 
One would naturally expect the frequency of contact with the patients and the level of 
responsibilities in the health facility to be positively correlated with both the prevalence and 
intensity of informal charges. For instance, hospital attendants who do not provide care are 
probably the least able to extract money from patients, whereas doctors who can refuse to see 
patients or oblige them to sustain long waiting times wield more power and therefore can 
  12demand or command more. This is confirmed by tables 2 and 3 which show that doctors and 
nurses charge more often than the other categories of staff. Doctors also levy a significantly 
higher amount, almost twice the national average. Though administrators charge less often 
than nurses, they collect a bit more money from informal payments. Hospital attendants 
indeed have limited extortion power; they fare best in Khatlon with an average 6.2 somonis a 
month and do not have access to this source of income in Dushanbe and GBAO. The average 
health worker supplements her income with 28.8 somonis a month from direct charges on the 
patients.  
 
Informal payments are important both by their extent and scale. Table 3 shows that the 
average monthly intake from informal payments represents 61.8 percent of the sector per 
capita monthly wage bill including allowances and other supplements. Doctors in Dushanbe 
make almost twice, 1.8 times, their salary from informal payments. Men charge more 
aggressively and levy about 2.5 times the amount of informal payments collected by women. 
These numbers appear more in line with the reality of corruption than the amounts involved 
in experimental studies. It is in fact rare in experiments that the average gain of participants 
exceeds $10 which probably may not impact on people’s behavior. Finally, the status of 
GBAO is noteworthy. Only 2.8 percent of the health workers and 4.8 percent of the doctors 
admit they resort to informal charges for income generation. Also, none of the administrators 
or hospital attendants confessed charging patients. Moreover, the average monthly levy in 
GBAO is just 1.5 somonis.  
 
Table 4: Probability of Moonlighting (%) 
  Doctor Nurse/Feldsher  Administrator Hosp.  Att   All 
            
Dushanbe  25.7 20.8  25.0 0.0    22.4 
Sogd  25.8 19.0  27.7  23.3    22.6 
Khatlon  17.6 9.5  17.9  8.8    12.8 
RRS  33.9 36.5  34.4 9.5    30.3 
GBAO  14.3 2.2  0.0 0.0    3.7 
            
Men  29.4 37.0  31.1  50.0    31.6 
Women  12.8 13.0  12.4 9.2    12.1 
            
Tajikistan  23.8 16.9  21.4  10.1    18.5 
Source: Authors’ calculations from Tajikistan Health PETS 2006 data 
Note: Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) and Rayon under Republican Subordination (RRS) are regions 
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supplement their low income. The highest rate of moonlighting is observed in the RRS with 
30.3 percent. Dushanbe where the average health worker earns almost twice the average 
wage comes in third place following Sogd. This probably reflects the better outside 
opportunities offered in the capital city. Although, GBAO’s health workers have the lowest 
wages, only 3.7 percent of them provide labor for pay outside their facility. There is again a 
significant gender gap since male workers are more than twice as likely [that is,19.5 
percentage points more likely] to supplement their income by working elsewhere than 
women. Doctors and administrators also moonlight more when compared to other staff 
members. 
 
What kind of labor are moonlighters more likely to perform? The most common activity, 
practiced by 53.5 percent of the respondents, is holding of an agricultural job, followed by 
the private provision of care done by 23.6 percent of the interviewees. In Dushanbe, 62.5 
percent of moonlighters provide care for their private benefit. Some of the health workers are 
employed by another private (6.5 percent) or another public (6.5 percent) provider. On 
average, the health workers provide 21 hours per week for outside facility activities. Less 
than 15 percent of the workers hold two or more jobs outside the facility. 
 
Table 6 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis along with a test of 
equality of means between genders. Except for the level of satisfaction, the altruism measure, 
and the community characteristics, female health workers differ from their male counterparts 
in all other respects. They are less likely to resort to informal charges, engage less often in 
outside activities, be in higher proportions in the rural facilities, etc. Will the raw differences 
resist to a more complete multivariate analysis? 
 
4. Econometric  Specification 
 
We will investigate the determinants of the propensity to engage in informal charging and 
moonlighting using a simple probit approach. The basic specification for this model is: 
 
)
( ) 1 Pr( 3 2 1
ifc c fc ifc
ifc ifc fc fc ifc ifc
Y Z X POS
FAIR PAY FSH FHD F ILLACT
ε ζ θ η λ
δ γ β β β α
+ ′ ⋅ + ′ ⋅ + ′ ⋅ + ′ ⋅ +
⋅ + ⋅ + + + + Φ = =
 (1) 
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Where  Φ is the normal cumulative distribution function, and ILLACTifc denotes whether 
health staff i, working in facility f, located in community c has engaged in the relevant 
corrupt activity under study i.e. either informal charging or moonlighting. The β’s are our 
main coefficients of interest. On the gender-related variables of interest, Fifc is the female 
dummy, FHDfc the dummy for female-headed facility, and FSHfc is the proportion of women 
in the facility. The other two variables we focus on are FAIRifc which is the ratio between the 
perceived fair salary and the actual salary of the health worker, and PAYifc a dummy 
indicating whether the health worker thinks that a user fees policy should be in place. POS 
represents the vector of dummies for the position (doctor, nurse, or administrative staff) held 
by the health worker within the facility to test whether this has any impact on the likelihood 
of corruption. We also control for a whole set of individual, Xifc, facility, Yfc, and community, 
Zc characteristics. Finally, εifc is the stochastic error term. 
 
The β coefficients capture the various effects of gender on corruption. We expect all of them 
to be negative since the literature consistently finds women to be less corrupt, female leaders 
to rein in corruption more aggressively, and the share of women in an organization or the 
labor force to also lead to reduced levels of corruption. 
 
Opportunities and capacity to extract bribes and moonlight may depend on the position of the 
health worker and the environment. Because they treat patients and prescribe drugs, doctors 
have more power for extracting payments from patients than, say, hospital attendants whose 
position barely affords them the capacity to impose on patients. Any gender effect may be 
masked if all women are bunched together. To account for this possibility, the specification 
given by equation (1) needs to be slightly changed.  
 
)
( ) 1 Pr( 3 2 1
ifc c fc ifc ifc
ifc fc fc ifc j
j
j ifc
Y Z X FAIR POS
PAY FSH FHD F POS ILLACT
ε ζ θ η δ λ
γ β β β α
+ ′ ⋅ + ′ ⋅ + ′ ⋅ + ⋅ + ′ ⋅ +
⋅ + + + ⋅ ⋅ + Φ = = ∑
 (2) 
 
Specification (2) is simply (1) where the gender dummy has been replaced with its 
interactions with the different possible positions. The β1 coefficients capture the gender 
difference by type of staff. A negative coefficient when interacted with the variable “doctor” 
  15would indicate a lower propensity to charge patients for female doctors relative to male 
doctors. The results for this specification are given in column 6 for the whole sample and 
column 7 when GBAO is excluded in tables 8, 9, 10 and 11.  
 
We used first a probit approach because the decision to engage in corruption is important by 
itself. It is also of paramount interest to pin down the determinants of the levels of informal 
charges health workers levy on a monthly basis. For that purpose, we will use both a simple 
OLS approach and a corner solution models such as the Tobit because of possible clustering 
around zero income from informal payments. The basic specifications are thus: 
 
ifc c fc ifc ifc
ifc fc fc ifc ifc
Y Z X FAIR
POS PAY FSH FHD F INFAMT
ε ζ θ η δ
λ γ β β β α
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INFAMTifc is the amount of income the health worker received from informal payments. In 
all the regressions, the standards errors are corrected for clustering at the facility level. We 
choose to cluster at such a low level because of the strong possibility of differences in the 
tolerance for corruption at the facility level. For instance, in some facilities health workers 
may collude and adopt a tacit rule that charging patients is just ok. By contrast, in another it 
may be that the head of the facility is a bit more stringent about corruption. One may think 
that clustering at the facility level may artificially reduce the size of the standard errors 
because of correlations at a higher administrative level. All the regressions have thus been 
run with errors clustered at the jamoat level. The results remained essentially unchanged and 
we therefore report only the first set of results.  
 
 
4.1 Control  Variables 
 
There are number of possible variables that could impact the willingness of health workers to 
engage in corrupt practices and are potential confounding factors. We therefore control for a 
wide variety of community, facility, household, and individual characteristics.  
 
  164.1.1 Community  Characteristics 
 
We control for three important community characteristics the facility is located and the 
health worker lives in. We use data from the recent Tajikistan map which combines data 
from the 2000 census and the 2003 LSMS. We control for the size of the community by 
including the number of households. We control also for the level of development of and 
inequality in the community by including the average household’s total consumption per 
capita adjusted for regional prices and its Gini coefficient. Socio-economic variables may 
impact the willingness and the ability to charge patients. Indeed, one may think that health 
workers are less reluctant to charge wealthier people, in part because, the latter are likely 
more able to defend themselves against such predatory practices. Which effect dominates is 
then an empirical question we tackle next. Moonlighting is more likely in wealthier 
communities with more vibrant local economies which increases the opportunity cost of 
time. We also control for regional characteristics by including dummy variables for the 5 
regions of Tajikistan, using Dushanbe as the reference. 
 
4.1.2 Facility  Characteristics 
 
For a fixed supply of patients, the higher the number of health workers in the facility the 
more intense the competition for bribe extraction. It could also reduce the likelihood of 
asking informal payments because there are more “eyes” that monitor. We therefore control 
for the size of the facility. A related variable is the type of the facility. It has been shown by 
several studies (see e.g. Lewis 2007) that informal payments are more likely in in-patients 
services. This may be due to the frailty of hospitalized patients who come with severe 
illnesses which reduce their refusal power and make them more willing to pay for care. 
Finally, we introduce a dummy for facilities that operate in rural areas. 
 
4.1.3  Household and Individual Characteristics 
 
The most difficult variables to control for are at the household and individual levels. It is for 
instance impossible in cross-country analyses to include these important controls. Even 
studies based on firm-level surveys or experimental data rarely include additional 
  17characteristics beyond education level. We control for a rich set of variables which are 
potentially confounding factors.  
 
At the household level, we introduce a dummy capturing whether the health worker is the 
single wage-earner in the household. The presence of another wage earner probably reduces 
the pressure to earn more especially through illegal means. We may then expect only-wage-
earners to engage more often in informal charging everything else equal. The same argument 
also works for moonlighting.  
 
At the individual level, we control for age because it is widely believed that younger 
individuals are more likely to engage in illegal activities. Akerlof (1998) unveils fundamental 
differences between married and single men, with the latter more likely to engage in 
substance abuse, be crime-victims, and also indulge in criminal activities and be incarcerated. 
We introduce a dummy for married health workers to control for these effects. There is less 
evidence on the impact of parenthood on the participation in illegal spheres. A recent notable 
exception is Folland (2006) who finds that exogenous shocks in an individual’s social capital 
such as marriage or a new child change her attitude toward risk and reduces likelihood of 
engaging in crime or unhealthy behavior. Corman et al. (2006) on the other hand find that the 
birth of a child with a serious health problem increases the father’s likelihood to become or 
remain involved in illegal activities. The presence of children creates countervailing 
incentives. On one hand, the more children one has the higher the necessary income to make 
a decent living, hence the more likely it is for workers to charge patients. On the other hand, 
because charging patients is illegal and entails social stigma which one would like to shield 
her children from, this plays counter to the first effect and decreases the willingness to 
engage in such practices. We therefore control for the number of children.  
 
Finally, we include controls for experience in the health sector, whether the worker is 
satisfied working in the facility, her willingness to leave the facility, a dummy indicating 
whether her main reason for choosing the health sector was to help others, and a dummy 
variable for altruism if she financed the health care needs of non-household members.  
 
  184.2 Results 
 
4.2.1.  Likelihood of Informally Charging Patients 
 
Table 8 presents the results of the probit regressions of informal charging. The controls are 
introduced sequentially to better identify the impact of each. The first four columns show that 
women are significantly less likely to engage in informal charging than men. The coefficient 
is strong and stable at around 10 percent despite controlling for location, community, facility, 
and individuals characteristics. The introduction of individual characteristics more than 
doubles the explanatory power of the model with the Pseudo R-square jumping to 0.22 in 
model 4 up from 0.11 in model 3. This underscores the importance of controlling for 
individual characteristics to understand corruption incidence. The female dummy loses 
significance as soon as one control for the position of the health worker. Doctors and nurses 
are about 20 percent more likely to charge than administrative staff who themselves are 17 
percent more likely to resort to informal payments than hospital attendants. It looks therefore, 
like it is the power provided by position that matters for engaging in corrupt activity. Indeed 
the hypothesis that doctors, nurses and administrators are equally likely to charge patients 
informally is strongly rejected (p-value <0.00001). The gender-effect is totally trumped by 
the introduction of the staff’s position. To probe this result further, we compare women to 
their male peers by replacing the female dummy with its interactions with the various 
positions. The results of this new specification are shown in column 6 for the whole sample 
and column 7 when GBAO is excluded. The results slightly change with the coefficient on 
doctor strengthening in size and precision, whereas the coefficients on nurse and 
administrators weaken but remain strong. Doctors are now significantly more likely to 
engage in informal charging than nurses by about 10 percentage points. None of the 
interaction variables is significant meaning that with equal bargaining power and 
opportunities to extract bribes women are just as likely as men to abuse that power for their 
personal benefit. We cannot reject the equality of the three interaction terms to zero (the p-
value of the test is 0.59).  
 
  19Contrary to the results obtained by Swamy et al. (2001) for private firms and Duflo and 
Topalova (2004) for public administrations, female leadership does not reduce the incidence 
of corruption as the female-head dummy coefficient is insignificant in all regressions. 
Moreover, the proportion of women in the facility has no impact whatsoever on the 
likelihood of informal charging, countering the results obtained by Swamy et al. (2001) and 
Dollar et al. (2001) that greater (political) representation of women reduces corruption. To 
test the Gokcekus and Mukherjee (2004) proposition of an optimal share of women we 
included in all the specifications a quadratic for that variable. The latter is significant in none 
of the regressions and leaves essentially unaffected all the results. We then dropped the 
quadratic term in the remaining analysis. 
 
The fair wage-corruption hypothesis gains some traction. As a matter of fact the coefficient 
on the ratio of fair to actual salary is very strong and stable across all the models. The higher 
the distance between the perceived fair salary and the actual remuneration of the health 
worker, the more likely she is to informally charge patients. Though the coefficient is small, 
the effect is sizeable because at the average (median) level of the ratio, the likelihood of 
extracting informal payments increases by 5 percent (4.2 percent). The high incidence of 
informal payments combined with the small coefficient on fair-wage corroborates the finding 
of Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) that to eradicate this practice solely by relying on 
salary increase would necessitate an increase in the wage bill beyond the government’s fiscal 
capacity. Finally, it is important to note that health workers who believe that user fees should 
be instituted are more likely to charge patients. This has important policy implications since 
it means that the institution of user fees, which is usually equated to the “formalization” of 
informal payments, may in fact reduce the prevalence of such practices. Even though in 
several places informal charges and user fees happily co-exist the sheer existence of the latter 
may induce health workers to refrain from frequently charging. 
 
Because GBAO look very much like an outlier region in many respects, column 7 replicates 
the model in column 6 where the health workers from GBAO have been taken out of the 
sample. The results are, however, quite robust to the exclusion of GBAO.  
 
  204.2.2  Levels of Informal Charges 
 
We now turn to the analysis of the absolute amounts health workers informally charge 
patients per month. As table 3 shows, informal payments constitute an important source of 
income for health workers. They levy on average 28.8 somonis (median is 5) per month or 
60.4% of the monthly average salary. If we condition on actually collecting informal 
payments, the average income goes up to 56.3 somonis (median is 30) a month or 1.2 times 
the average salary. We first investigate the determinants of the levels of informal payments 
collected with a simple OLS and then with a Tobit model because of the many health 
workers who report zero income from informal payments. 
 
Although women are equally likely to informally charge patients than men, they seem to 
charge much less aggressively. The female dummy is negative and significant across all the 
specifications. However, facilities headed by female and the proportion of women in the 
facility do not have any significant effect on the level of informal charges. Doctors raise 
significantly more money from informal payments than any other group of health workers. 
This is reminiscent of the Miller et al. (2000) finding that “tips” such as flowers, and 
chocolate went to the nurses whereas doctors received “money and expensive presents”. 
Though female doctors seem to charge patients less than their male colleagues, this does not 
hold for nurses and administrators. Health workers who think that patients should pay for 
care also charge more aggressively. Finally, although fair wage perceptions do not seem to 
impact the level of informal charges in the simple OLS regressions, they do matter when one 
considers the censored models. The farther the fair wage is from the actual salary, the more 
aggressive the health worker becomes in charging patients. The coefficient is, however, not 
very robust. 
 
4.2.3  Likelihood of Moonlighting 
 
Finally, we explore the determinants of moonlighting behavior. Unlike informal charging, 
there are strong gender differences for moonlighting. Indeed, women are significantly less 
likely than men to engage in work outside of the facility or hold a second job. The female 
  21dummy coefficient is strong and stable across all the specifications and shows that women 
are around 18 percent less likely to moonlight. Contrary to the informal payments model, the 
coefficient on the female dummy does not change much after the introduction of all the 
controls including all the dummy variables for the worker’s position in the facility. The 
position in the facility is not a significant determinant of moonlighting as shown by the 
results in column 5. Regressions 1 to 5 show that women are on average significantly less 
likely to moonlight. Introducing the interactions effects in model 6, we show that this result 
holds even within work categories. We can in fact safely reject the hypothesis that there are 
no gender differences in moonlighting across positions (see test 3 with p-value<0.0001). 
Women doctors, nurses, and administrators are all significantly less likely to moonlight than 
their male colleagues. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that gender differences in 
moonlighting behavior are identical across positions. Therefore, the difference between male 
and female doctors is the same as that between men and women nurses. The result that 
women are less likely to moonlight may appear surprising given the fact that they are just 
equally likely to engage in informal charging if one considers both activities as illegal. One 
possible reason for the difference maybe that women supply more hours of labor for 
household’s production, a claim our data do not, unfortunately, allow us to evaluate. It is also 
noteworthy that there is less moonlighting in female-headed facilities again contrary to the 
informal payments models. 
 
Just as informally charging patients, moonlighting can be another way for a worker who 
perceives herself as being unfairly remunerated to get even. It is noteworthy that neither the 
fair to actual salary ratio nor the recognition that user fees should be imposed impact the 
likelihood to moonlight. Therefore, the behavior of Tajik health workers who evolve in a 
complete vacuum of accountability with high relative levels of corruption lends support for 
the fair wage- corruption hypothesis but does not support the fair wage-shirking hypothesis.  
 
Starting with Conway and Kimmel (1998) the literature shows that moonlighting is often due 
to restrictions in hours of labor supplied. Moonlighters would actually like to work more 
hours but are permitted to do so in their primary job by their employer. Moonlighting is thus 
just an optimal response to this constraint. This theory does not hold for Tajikistan health 
  22workers because moonlighters report to work as many hours in the facility than those who do 
not hold a second job. It is more likely in this case that the lack of accountability and 
oversight drive moonlighting. Krishnan (1990) shows using the second wave of the US 
Survey of Income and Program Participation that husbands are less likely to moonlight when 
their wives also are in the labor force. We test a similar proposition here by including a 
dummy variable for the presence of at least one other wage earner in the health worker’s 
household.





A large and growing literature strongly and consistently suggests that women are less corrupt 
than men. This paper, using a unique dataset on health workers in Tajikistan, shows that with 
equal power and equal opportunities, women are in fact just as likely as men to engage in 
corrupt activities. The result is obtained in an arguably ideal setting for testing gender 
differences towards corruption. Indeed, Tajik health workers operate within a risk-free 
environment which features a near-zero probability of corruption detection and no risk of 
sanction either through job loss of other non-pecuniary punishment. It is in these kinds of 
environments that the willingness to engage in corruption truly manifests itself allowing for 
an easier and more precise estimation of its determinants. Contrary to the literature, the paper 
also shows that female-headed health facilities experience the same incidence of informal 
charging. Although women appear to have the same propensity for extracting informal 
payments from patients, they are still shown to be less aggressive than men and collect 
smaller amounts. Women are also less likely than men to work outside the facility or hold a 
second job. 
 
The paper presents some other interesting findings. For instance it presents evidence that 
workers who perceive themselves as unfairly rewarded for their effort will try to get even not 
by withdrawing effort but by engaging in corrupt activity if they have the opportunity. 
Another noteworthy finding that emerges is that workers who think that patients should get 
care for a fee are more likely to charge patients and charge significantly more. This may 
                                                 
13 We do not restrict this other wage earner to be the health worker’s spouse however. 
  23serve as a rationale for countries contemplating the institution of a user fees policy in their 
health sector to gauge workers’ perception about the gratuity of services. 
 
The well documented low level of women’s representation in legislative bodies and 
executive cabinets across the world may partly be due to the fact that women display less 
self-confidence and are more reluctant to compete (Barber and Odean 2001, and Niederle and 
Vesterlund 2007). Indeed, seats in legislatures are up for grabs through competitive elections. 
This constitutes a strong rationale to institute quotas in the name of gender equality as France 
did for its legislative bodies or Mexico City and Lima for their police corps. However, based 
on the findings of this paper one should not expect the mere institution of such a policy to 
cause lower levels of corruption or higher growth. Corruption certainly must be fought using 
more conventional means such as carrots and sticks. 
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Table 5: DATA DESCRIPTION 
Variable Name  Variable Description   
    
INFPAY  Dummy for Receipt of Informal Payments   
INFAMT  Average Monthly Amount of Informal Payments Collected   
MOONL  Dummy for Moonlighting   
FEMALE  Dummy for Woman   
FEMHD  Dummy indicating a Female-Headed Facility   
FEMSHR  Proportion of Women in Facility   
HEALTH WORKER POSITION   
DOCTOR  Dummy indicating Employee is a Doctor   
FEMDOC  Interaction Female x Doctor   
NURSE  Dummy indicating Employee is a Nurse/Feldsher   
FEMNURSE  Interaction Female x Nurse   
ADMIN  Dummy indicating Employee is a Administrator   
FEMADMIN  Interaction Female x Administrator   
FACILITY CHARACTERISTICS   
RURAL  Dummy indicating Facility is Rural   
SIZE  Number of Health Workers in Facility   
TYPE  Categorical variable for the type of facility (Hospital, Medical House, etc.)   
SOGD  Sogd Region Dummy   
KHATLON  Khatlon Region Dummy   
RRS  Rayons under Republican Subordination Dummy   
GBAO  GBAO Region Dummy   
HEALTH WORKER CHARACTERISTICS   
AGE  Age of Health Worker   
AGE2  Age Squared   
EXPER  Experience in the Health Sector   
EXPER2 Experience  Squared   
MARRIED  Dummy for Married   
NKIDS  # of Children   
WGEARN  Dummy indicating there is at Least One Other Wage-Earner in Household   
FAIR  Ratio of Fair over Actual Salary   
QUIT  Dummy indicating the Health Worker Willingness to Leave Facility   
SATISF  Dummy indicating the Health Worker is Satisfied of her Work   
PAY  Dummy indicating the Health Worker thinks Patients Must Pay for Care   
ALTR  Dummy indicating Spending Money for Others’ Health Needs   
HELPOTH  Dummy indicating that Help Others is Reason for Choosing Health Sector   
COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS   
NHHLDS  Number of Households in Community – Census 2000   
MCONS  Average Household Total Consumption – Census 2000   
AGINI  Community Consumption Gini Coefficient – Census 2000   
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Table 6: SUMMARY STATISTICS AND COMPARISON OF MEN AND WOMEN 
   All  Health  Workers   Mean     
   Mean  S.D.  Median    Male  Female  Difference  T-test 
# Observations    1191 1191 1191   389  802    
INFPAY   0.51  0.5  1   0.6  0.47  0.13  4.454*** 
INFAMT   28.84  71.04  5   48.24  19.43  28.81  6.685*** 
MOONL   0.18  0.39  0   0.32  0.12  0.2  8.372*** 
FEMALE   0.67  0.47  1   0  1     
FEMHD   0.23  0.42  0   0.07  0.31  -.23  -9.263*** 
FEMSHR    69.93 20.68 69.23   60.91 74.3  -13.39 -10.996*** 
DOCTOR   0.27  0.44  0   0.55  0.14  0.41  16.750*** 
FEMDOC   0.09  0.29  0   0  0.14     
NURSE   0.42  0.49  0   0.21  0.53  -0.32  -10.919*** 
FEMNURSE   0.35  0.48  0   0  0.53     
ADMIN   0.16  0.36  0   0.23  0.12  0.11  4.958*** 
FEMADMIN   0.08  0.27  0   0  0.12     
RURAL   0.68  0.47  1   0.63  0.7  -0.07  -2.105*** 
SIZE   75.98  137.87  19   85.96  71.14  14.82  1.741** 
SOGD   0.28  0.45  0   0.29  0.27  0.02  0.491 
KHATLON   0.39  0.49  0   0.42  0.37  0.05  1.789** 
RRS   0.19  0.39  0   0.19  0.18  0.01  0.447 
GBAO   0.09  0.29  0   0.04  0.12  -0.08  -4.447*** 
AGE   40.84  9.65  41   42.62  39.98  2.64  4.465*** 
EXPER    16.92 9.94  16.33   17.82 16.48 1.34  2.194*** 
SATISF   0.76  0.43  1   0.76  0.76  -0.002  -0.085 
ALTR   0.68  0.46  1   0.69  0.68  0.0069  0.240 
QUIT   0.54  0.50  1   0.61  0.51  0.1016  3.314*** 
HELPOTH   0.71  0.45  1   0.77  0.68  0.0929  3.333*** 
PAY   0.34  0.47  0   0.39  0.31  0.0739  2.535*** 
MARRIED   0.8  0.4  1   0.98  0.71  0.27  11.192*** 
NKIDS   3.42  2.15  3   4.2  3.04  1.16  9.025*** 
WGEARN   0.58  0.49  1   0.48  0.63  -0.15  -5.061*** 
FAIR   11.84  12.92  8.33   15.93  9.86  6.07  7.8015*** 
NHHLDS   6703.93  9368.22  2479    7304.54  6412.61  891.9  1.542 
MCONS    46.52 14.39 45.16   46.19 46.69 -.495  -0.557 
AGINI    0.31 0.02 0.31   0.31 0.31 -.0002  -0.162 
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Table 7: Regression of the Variables on Missing Dummy (=1 if infpay not missing) 
  Full Sample  GBAO Excluded 
  Coef on Samp  Robust t-stat  Coef on Samp  Robust t-stat 
MOONL  -0.047 (1.21) -0.042 (0.95) 
FEMALE  0.028 (0.59) 0.003 (0.05) 
FEMHD  0.09 (1.76)*  0.067  (1.33) 
FEMSHR  2.765 (1.13) -0.552  (0.21) 
DOCTOR  -0.076 (1.76)*  -0.108 (2.34)** 
FEMDOC  -0.023 (0.79) -0.045 (1.72)* 
NURSE  0.026 (0.44) 0.035 (0.53) 
FEMNURSE  0.036 (0.64) 0.038 (0.61) 
ADMIN  0.061 (1.32) 0.103 (1.91)* 
FEMADMIN  0.033 (0.99) 0.05  (1.28) 
PAY  -0.085 (1.66)*  -0.111 (2.06)** 
RURAL  0.094 (1.85)*  0.111 (1.97)** 
SIZE  -24.841 (1.53)  -38.514 (3.12)*** 
SOGD  -0.118 (2.80)***  -0.107 (2.16)** 
KHATLON  0.026 (0.47) 0.087 (1.42) 
RRS  0.01 (0.22)  0.039  (0.73) 
GBAO  0.104 (2.35)**  --  -- 
OTHER HOSPITAL  -0.041 (1.31) -0.043 (1.25) 
POLYCLINIC  -0.041 (1.67)*  -0.054 (2.07)** 
SUB  -0.047 (1.38) -0.024 (0.60) 
SVA  0.017 (0.42) 0.06  (1.19) 
FAP  0.137 (2.44)**  0.093 (1.54) 
OTHER  0.028 (0.88) 0.038 (0.97) 
AGE  -8.542 (8.40)***  -8.59  (7.30)*** 
EXPER  -9.869 (9.92)***  -9.762 (8.50)*** 
MARRIED  -0.202 (3.87)***  -0.206 (3.64)*** 
NKIDS  -1.237 (4.65)***  -1.264 (4.09)*** 
WGEARN  -0.029 (0.52) -0.025 (0.40) 
QUIT  0.048 (0.80) 0.032 (0.47) 
SATISF  -0.07 (1.28)  -0.034  (0.62) 
ALTR  -0.202 (3.54)***  -0.202 (3.16)*** 
HELPOTH  -0.022 (0.44) -0.041 (0.75) 
NHHLDS  -2,347.60 (2.79)*** -2,260.82 (2.31)** 
MCONS -0.364  (0.25)  0.83  (0.51) 
AGINI 0.003  (1.05)  -0.001  (0.33) 
Note: 
1. Each line is a regression of the variable listed on the dummy indicating that the information on informal 
charging is missing because the respondent refused to answer the question and a constant term. 
2. Standard errors are clustered at the facility level. 
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Table 8: Probit Regression Results for Informal Charges – Marginal Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Female (β1)  -0.106*** -0.105*** -0.109*** -0.099**  -0.024     
  (3.09) (3.08) (3.15) (2.51) (0.53)    
Female head (β2)  0.022 0.021 0.008 -0.017  -0.032  -0.036  -0.026 
  (0.48) (0.47) (0.15) (0.29) (0.57) (0.62) (0.44) 
Proportion women (β3)    3.35E-4  -3.9E-4  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
      (0.29) (0.32) (0.76) (0.89) (0.62) 
Doctor (λ1)      0.375***  0.407***  0.382*** 
      (5.22)  (5.83)  (5.78) 
Female x Doctor (β11)       -0.074  -0.09 
       (1.10)  (1.32) 
Nurse (λ2)      0.341***  0.312***  0.300*** 
      (5.09)  (3.68)  (3.62) 
Female x Nurse (β12)       0.043  0.04 
       (0.58)  (0.55) 
Administrator (λ3)      0.178***  0.168**  0.161** 
      (2.63)  (2.21)  (2.20) 
Female x Admin. (β13)       0.036  0.026 
       (0.42)  (0.31) 
Fair/Actual Salary     0.005***  0.005***  0.005***  0.005*** 
     (3.35)  (3.10)  (3.05)  (3.10) 
Patients should pay     0.131***  0.110**  0.112***  0.108** 
     (3.19)  (2.56)  (2.61)  (2.53) 
Location Controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Community Controls  NO  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Facility Controls  NO  NO  YES YES YES YES YES 
Individual Controls  NO NO NO YES  YES  YES  YES 
Position in Facility  NO NO NO NO YES  YES  YES 
Interaction Effects  NO NO NO NO NO YES  YES 
Observations  1191 1191 1191 1191 1191 1191 1082 
Pseudo R-squared  0.1  0.1  0.11 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.17 
Log Likelihood  -741.72 -739.24 -730.39 -646.53 -627.98 -627.18 -615.87 
Test 1: λ1=λ2=λ3=0 (p-value)      0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Test 2: λ1=λ2=λ3 (p-value)      0.0003  0.0017  0.0022 
Test 3: β11=β12=β13=0 (p-value)       0.5872  0.4934 
Test 4: β11=β12=β13 (p-value)       0.3836  0.3161 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Notes: 
1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
2. Location controls are the dummies for the 5 regions of Tajikistan, Sogd, GBAO, Khatlon, and the RRS Dushanbe serves 
as the reference region. GBAO is not included in regression 7. 
3. Community controls are number of households, average household total consumption, and the Gini of consumption. All 
variables are computed at the jamoat level using the 2002 census. The jamoat is the lowest administrative level; 104 of the 
356 jamoats in Tajikistan are included in the survey. 
4. Facility controls include the size of the facility, the type of the facility, whether the facility is rural. 
5. Individual controls include age, experience in the health sector with their squares, whether the health worker is married 
and the number of children, the health worker’s satisfaction working in the facility, her willingness to quit the facility, the 
reason she chose to work in the health sector, whether she used her own money to cater to the health needs of non-members 
of her household, and whether there is at least one other wage earner in the health worker’s household. Finally we include a 
dummy for whether the health worker thinks that patients should pay for the care they receive, and the ration between the 
salary the health worker considers fair and her own salary. 
6. Position controls are dummies variables for doctor, nurse/feldsher, and administrative staff. The hospital attendants are 
the reference category. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Female (β1)  -0.182*** -0.182*** -0.200*** -0.184*** -0.185***    
  (7.23) (7.36) (7.85) (6.15) (5.28)    
Female head (β2)  -0.024 -0.029 -0.067**  -0.076** -0.076** -0.079** -0.081** 
  (0.81) (1.01) (2.17) (2.41) (2.41) (2.55) (2.25) 
Proportion women (β3)      0.001** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
      (2.02) (2.30) (2.34) (2.35) (2.30) 
Doctor (λ1)      0.012  0.183***  0.189*** 
      (0.26)  (3.54)  (3.34) 
Female x Doctor (β11)       -0.100***  -0.129*** 
       (2.82)  (3.35) 
Nurse (λ2)      0.033  0.218***  0.238*** 
      (0.81)  (3.97)  (3.91) 
Female x Nurse (β12)       -0.164***  -0.187*** 
       (4.29)  (4.42) 
Administrator (λ3)      0.035  0.237***  0.263*** 
      (0.75)  (3.84)  (3.84) 
Female x Admin. (β13)       -0.110***  -0.127*** 
       (2.75)  (2.80) 
Fair/Actual Salary     0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
     (1.27)  (1.28)  (1.31)  (1.18) 
Patients should pay     0.021  0.023  0.022  0.03 
     (0.85)  (0.90)  (0.89)  (1.06) 
Location Controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Community Controls  NO  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Facility Controls  NO  NO  YES YES YES YES YES 
Individual Controls  NO NO NO YES  YES  YES  YES 
Position in Facility  NO NO NO NO YES  YES  YES 
Interaction Effects  NO NO NO NO NO YES  YES 
Observations  1278 1278 1278 1191 1191 1191 1082 
Pseudo R-squared  0.11 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.12 
Log Likelihood  -541.79 -533.61 -523.66 -488.47 -487.87 -489.09 -473.94 
Test 1: λ1=λ2=λ3=0 (p-value)    0.7147  0.0001  0.0001 
Test 2: λ1=λ2=λ3 (p-value)    0.7374  0.5013  0.3737 
Test 3: β11=β12=β13=0 (p-value)      0.0000  0.0000 
Test 4: β11=β12=β13 (p-value)      0.6187  0.8000 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Notes: 
1. Standard errors are clustered at the facility level. 
2. Location controls are the dummies for the 5 regions of Tajikistan, Sogd, GBAO, Khatlon, and the RRS Dushanbe serves 
as the reference region. GBAO is not included in regression 7. 
3. Community controls are number of households, average household total consumption, and the Gini of consumption. All 
variables are computed at the jamoat level using the 2002 census. The jamoat is the lowest administrative level; 104 of the 
356 jamoats in Tajikistan are included in the survey. 
4. Facility controls include the size of the facility, the type of the facility, whether the facility is rural. 
5. Individual controls include age, experience in the health sector with their squares, whether the health worker is married 
and the number of children, the health worker’s satisfaction working in the facility, her willingness to quit the facility, the 
reason she chose to work in the health sector, whether she used her own money to cater to the health needs of non-members 
of her household, and whether there is at least one other wage earner in the health worker’s household. Finally we include a 
dummy for whether the health worker thinks that patients should pay for the care they receive, and the ration between the 
salary the health worker considers fair and her own salary. 
6. Position controls are dummies variables for doctor, nurse/feldsher, administrative staff. The hospital attendants are 
considered as the reference category. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Female (β1)  -28.23*** -27.96*** -27.47*** -25.02*** -18.01***    
  (4.66) (4.70) (4.64) (4.04) (2.90)    
Female head (β2)  5.92  5.867 8.706 6.22  4.998 4.294 3.984 
  (1.04) (1.01) (1.65) (1.20) (0.99) (0.88) (0.68) 
Proportion women (β3)    -0.03  -0.037  -0.067  -0.102  -0.111 
      (0.24) (0.31) (0.56) (0.87) (0.86) 
Doctor (λ1)      18.317**  41.532***  43.686*** 
      (2.38)  (4.08)  (4.11) 
Female x Doctor (β11)       -36.35***  -37.87*** 
       (3.24)  (3.15) 
Nurse (λ2)      2.177  7.93  9.042 
      (0.38)  (1.10)  (1.20) 
Female x Nurse (β12)       -4.004  -3.859 
       (0.73)  (0.67) 
Administrator (λ3)      4.305  10.361**  13.028** 
      (0.83)  (2.11)  (2.42) 
Female x Admin. (β13)       3.022  2.657 
       (0.37)  (0.28) 
Fair/Actual Salary     0.181  0.14  0.129  0.114 
     (1.35)  (1.02)  (0.90)  (0.80) 
Patients should pay     11.492**  9.583**  9.952**  10.781** 
     (2.42)  (2.01)  (2.09)  (2.05) 
Location Controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Community Controls  NO  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Facility Controls  NO  NO  YES YES YES YES YES 
Individual Controls  NO NO NO YES  YES  YES  YES 
Position in Facility  NO NO NO NO YES  YES  YES 
Interaction Effects  NO NO NO NO NO YES  YES 
Observations  1191 1191 1191 1191 1191 1191 1082 
Pseudo R-squared  0.1  0.1  0.12 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14 
Test 1: λ1=λ2=λ3=0 (p-value)    0.0053  0.0004  0.0003 
Test 2: λ1=λ2=λ3 (p-value)    0.0019  0.0014  0.0017 
Test 3: β11=β12=β13=0 (p-value)      0.0117  0.0177 
Test 4: β11=β12=β13 (p-value)      0.0086  0.0142 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Notes: 
1. Standard errors are clustered at the facility level. 
2. Location controls are the dummies for the 5 regions of Tajikistan, Sogd, GBAO, Khatlon, and the RRS Dushanbe serves 
as the reference region. GBAO is not included in regression 7. 
3. Community controls are number of households, average household total consumption, and the Gini of consumption. All 
variables are computed at the jamoat level using the 2002 census. The jamoat is the lowest administrative level; 104 of the 
356 jamoats in Tajikistan are included in the survey. 
4. Facility controls include the size of the facility, the type of the facility, whether the facility is rural. 
5. Individual controls include age, experience in the health sector with their squares, whether the health worker is married 
and the number of children, the health worker’s satisfaction working in the facility, her willingness to quit the facility, the 
reason she chose to work in the health sector, whether she used her own money to cater to the health needs of non-members 
of her household, and whether there is at least one other wage earner in the health worker’s household. Finally we include a 
dummy for whether the health worker thinks that patients should pay for the care they receive, and the ration between the 
salary the health worker considers fair and her own salary. 
6. Position controls are dummies variables for doctor, nurse/feldsher, administrative staff. The hospital attendants are 
considered as the reference category. 
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Table 11: Regression (TOBIT) Results for Amount of Informal Charges – Marginal Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Female (β1)  -30.3*** -29.9*** -29.7*** -29.1*** -16.6**     
  (6.11) (6.03) (5.88) (5.08) (2.55)    
Female head (β2)  2.253 2.131 2.326 1.513 0.555 0.109 0.466 
  (1.10) (1.04) (0.98) (0.64) (0.23) (0.05) (0.22) 
Proportion women (β3)    -0.581  -10.061  -17.347  -22.081  -17.450 
      (0.04) (0.75) (1.29) (1.64) (1.34) 
Doctor (λ1)      20.40***  28.52***  29.13*** 
      (4.70)  (6.91)  (6.84) 
Female x Doctor (β11)       -4.54***  -4.65*** 
       (3.56)  (3.76) 
Nurse (λ2)      20.81***  22.14***  21.63*** 
      (3.42)  (2.91)  (2.84) 
Female x Nurse (β12)       -0.173  -0.385 
       (0.03)  (0.08) 
Administrator (λ3)      5.799**  6.617**  6.535** 
      (2.37)  (2.84)  (2.33) 
Female x Admin. (β13)       0.638  0.481 
       (0.41)  (0.32) 
Fair/Actual Salary     5.823**  4.755  4.795  5.056* 
     (1.97)  (1.61)  (1.63)  (1.68)* 
Patients should pay     9.018***  7.189***  7.461***  7.446*** 
     (3.41)  (2.70)  (2.81)  (2.76) 
Location Controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Community Controls  NO  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Facility Controls  NO  NO  YES YES YES YES YES 
Individual Controls  NO NO NO YES  YES  YES  YES 
Position in Facility  NO NO NO NO YES  YES  YES 
Interaction Effects  NO NO NO NO NO YES  YES 
Observations  1191 1191 1191 1191 1191 1191 1082 
Pseudo R-squared  0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 
Log Likelihood  -4009.84 -4008.95 -3996.78 -3945.45 -3933.12 -3929.76 -3903.83 
Test 1: λ1=λ2=λ3=0 (p-value)     0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Test 2: λ1=λ2=λ3 (p-value)     0.0029  0.0000  0.0000 
Test 3: β11=β12=β13=0 (p-value)      0.0042  0.0023 
Test 4: β11=β12=β13 (p-value)      0.0100  0.0073 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Notes: 
1. Location controls are the dummies for the 5 regions of Tajikistan, Sogd, GBAO, Khatlon, and the RRS Dushanbe serves 
as the reference region. GBAO is not included in regression 7. 
2. Community controls are number of households, average household total consumption, and the Gini of consumption. All 
variables are computed at the jamoat level using the 2002 census. The jamoat is the lowest administrative level; 104 of the 
356 jamoats in Tajikistan are included in the survey. 
3. Facility controls include the size of the facility, the type of the facility, whether the facility is rural. 
4. Individual controls include age, experience in the health sector with their squares, whether the health worker is married 
and the number of children, the health worker’s satisfaction working in the facility, her willingness to quit the facility, the 
reason she chose to work in the health sector, whether she used her own money to cater to the health needs of non-members 
of her household, and whether there is at least one other wage earner in the health worker’s household. Finally we include a 
dummy for whether the health worker thinks that patients should pay for the care they receive, and the ration between the 
salary the health worker considers fair and her own salary. 
5. Position controls are dummies variables for doctor, nurse/feldsher, administrative staff. The hospital attendants are 
considered as the reference category. 
 
 